The current standard approach to demonstrate provable security of a block cipher against differential and linear cryptanalysis is based on the maximum expected differential and linear probability (MEDP and MELP) over a sequence of core cipher rounds. Often information about these values for a small number of rounds leads to significant insights concerning the security of the cipher for larger numbers of rounds, including the full cipher. Recent results have tightened the bounds on the MEDP and MELP for the two-round Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), but no previous approach has determined them exactly. An algorithm that computes the exact MEDP and MELP for the two-round AES is presented, and the computational results of our algorithm are provided. In addition to resolving this outstanding question for the AES, these exact values also lead to improved upper bounds on the MEDP and MELP for four or more AES rounds. involves proving that the maximum expected differential probability (MEDP) [respectively, maximum expected linear probability (MELP)] is sufficiently small over T core rounds [13] -this is because the corresponding estimate of the data complexity of the attack (the number of plaintext-ciphertext pairs required) is proportional to the inverse of the MEDP (respectively, MELP). (An even more rigorous approach takes into consideration the keydependent behaviour of the cipher, specifically the distribution of differential and linear probability (DP and LP) values over the space of keys. This appears to be a difficult problem that few researchers have tackled. For one notable recent result, see [14] , which treats issues similar to those of the current paper, but from a different direction.) Since in general it is difficult to compute the MEDP or MELP exactly, researchers have focused on bounds. A series of progressively smaller upper bounds have been obtained for the AES -the best of these are 1.161 Â 2 2111
Introduction
Several recent papers have dealt with provable security against differential [1] and linear cryptanalyses [2] for block ciphers based on the substitution-permutation network (SPN) structure [3 -11] . Most of these results apply directly to the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [12] (originally named Rijndael). The current standard approach to demonstrate provable security against differential cryptanalysis (respectively, linear cryptanalysis) involves proving that the maximum expected differential probability (MEDP) [respectively, maximum expected linear probability (MELP)] is sufficiently small over T core rounds [13] -this is because the corresponding estimate of the data complexity of the attack (the number of plaintext-ciphertext pairs required) is proportional to the inverse of the MEDP (respectively, MELP). (An even more rigorous approach takes into consideration the keydependent behaviour of the cipher, specifically the distribution of differential and linear probability (DP and LP) values over the space of keys. This appears to be a difficult problem that few researchers have tackled. For one notable recent result, see [14] , which treats issues similar to those of the current paper, but from a different direction.) Since in general it is difficult to compute the MEDP or MELP exactly, researchers have focused on bounds. A series of progressively smaller upper bounds have been obtained for the AES -the best of these are 1.161 Â 2
2111
(MEDP) and 1.064 Â 2 2106 (MELP), for T ! 4 [10] . [The upper bounds as stated in [10] (and cited in [6] [3, 6, 10] ; in both cases, the upper bound had been shown not to be tight [6] . We employ a new algorithm to prove that the two-round AES MEDP and MELP are in fact equal to these respective lower bounds. This immediately yields improved upper bounds for four or more AES rounds (hence for the full AES), namely (53/2 34 ) 4 2110 (MELP). There is a well-known duality between differential and linear cryptanalyses that often allows results for one attack to be translated into corresponding results for the other [15] . Since this is applicable to what follows, we focus on differential cryptanalysis; the modifications relevant to linear cryptanalysis are outlined in Section 5.
Note: An early version of this paper was posted as technical report 2005/321 in the IACR ePrint Archive (eprint.iacr.org).
Background concepts
Let N denote the cipher block size. An SPN consists of a sequence of rounds, each of which involves: (a) exclusive or (XOR) with an N-bit subkey (key-mixing stage), (b) parallel application of M bijective n Â n s-boxes, where M ¼ N/n (substitution stage), (c) processing through an invertible linear transformation L: f0,1g N ! f0,1g N (linear transformation stage). For simplification of analysis, we assume that the subkeys are chosen uniformly and independently from f0,1g N (a common assumption). We number the s-boxes in any substitution stage 1, . . . , M, left to right.
Let B: f0,1g
We refer to Dx/Dy as input/output differences. It is natural to view the DP values as entries in a 2 EDP(Dx, Dy)
We adopt the convention that an R-round block cipher is provably secure against differential cryptanalysis if, for certain values of T R, the MEDP is sufficiently small that the corresponding data complexity is prohibitive [13] (for SPNs, we often use T ¼ R 2 2). It is easy to show that adding one or more rounds to those under consideration can never increase the MEDP. A particularly useful relationship exists for the AES and related SPNs: if m is an upper bound on the two-round MEDP (or MELP), then m 4 is an upper bound on the MEDP (MELP) for T ! 4 [10, 11] .
Hereafter, all references to rounds are relative to T ! 2 core rounds under consideration; often T will be implicit in the notation we use. A differential characteristic is a vector V ¼ kDx ) are input/output differences for the substitution stage of round t, yielding input/output differences for each s-box S m t in round t, denoted by Dx m t /Dy m t (1 m M ). If Dx m t and Dy m t are both zero or both non-zero for every s-box, V is called consistent [16] ; it suffices to limit consideration to consistent characteristics. For a given characteristic V, an s-box with non-zero input/output differences is called active. The expected differential characteristic probability EDCP(V) is defined as
where DP S m t ( . , . ) is a DP value for s-box S m t . A non-active s-box always has a DP value of 1.
The differential DIFF(Dx, Dy) is the set of all characteristics whose first difference is Dx and whose last difference is Dy. The following well-known equality is central to our analysis [17] :
For any difference Dz [ f0,1g
M is defined as follows: partition Dz into M consecutive sub-blocks of length n; set g m ¼ 0 if the mth sub-block is zero, and g m ¼ 1 otherwise (1 m M). It follows that if Dz is an input or output difference for a substitution stage (taken from a characteristic), then g Dz is the corresponding pattern of active s-boxes.
Analysis of two-round SPN MEDP
Consider two consecutive SPN rounds; without loss of generality, omit the linear transformation from round 2. The minimum number of active s-boxes in these two rounds for any characteristic (excluding the all-zero characteristic) is called the differential branch number,
This 
is the number of characteristics in DIFF(Dx, Dy).
Let g, ĝ , Dx, Dy be as above. Enumerate the active s-boxes over the two rounds as S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S A , where
, and for each V w [ DIFF(Dx, Dy) (1 w W ) and each S a (1 a A), let 1 a w be the 'inner' difference for S a extracted from V w (an inner difference is either an output difference for a round 1 s-box, or an input difference for a round 2 s-box), and define the vector V w ¼ k1 
Note that B d -LIST (2) is not uniquely defined. Also note that our definition of B d -LIST (2) differs from [6] . Here, given g, ĝ [ f0,1g M \0 in Option 2, each B d -list is formed from the same (arbitrary) choice of positions to be assigned fixed values. In [6] , all such choices are used, but this is not necessary for our purposes (neither is it necessary for the results in [6] ).
For any Z [ B d -LIST, let d(Z) denote the number of vectors in Z. Lemma 1 implies that d(Z) (2 n 2 1). For any vector kz 1 , z 2 , . . . , z B d l in any B d -list, if z j is an output difference for a round 1 s-box, let a j be any input difference for the s-box, and let DP Ã (a j , z j ) ¼ DP(a j , z j ). If z j is an input difference for a round 2 s-box, let a j be any output difference for the s-box, and let DP Ã (a j , z j ) ¼ DP(z j , a j ). (For simplicity, the specific s-box is implicit in the notation.)
is the maximum value EDP(Dx, Dy) over all input/output differences Dx/Dy with patterns g/ĝ (clearly exactly B d s-boxes are active). If wt(g) þ wt(ĝ ) . B d , the intuitive explanation is more complicated. We can view the formation of Z in the following way. Choose any input/ output differences Dx/Dy with patterns g/ĝ , and take the subset of DIFF(Dx, Dy) specified by fixing inner differences for wt(g) þ wt(ĝ ) 2 B d of the active s-boxes (recall that DIFF(Dx, Dy) was defined to be a set); think of Z as this subset, absent the fixed information. If C is the product of the DP values for the s-boxes whose input and output differences are now fixed, it follows that the contribution of Z to EDP(Dx, Dy) in (1) is at most C . s(Z).
Theorem 1 ([6]):
The two-round MEDP is lower bounded by 
Exact two-round MEDP for the AES
The AES is an SPN with N ¼ 128, n ¼ 8, and all s-boxes identical [12] . The mapping L consists of a bytewise permutation followed by four identical 32-bit linear transformations applied in parallel. It is well known that analysis of the two-round AES reduces to analysis of the simplified structure in Fig. 1 for certain attacks -this is the case for differential (and linear) cryptanalysis. The branch number for the 32-bit linear transformation is B d ¼ 5; hereafter, we refer to 5-lists.
New algorithm
Our basic strategy for determining the exact value of the two-round AES MEDP is to show that the lower bound of Theorem 1 and the upper bound of Theorem 2 are equal. Since computing s(Z) for a single 5-list Z involves a maximum over approximately 2 40 terms, we use a pruning search to reduce complexity. (It is easy to show that 5-LIST (1) has size 56, requiring a maximum over 56 . 2 40 ' 2 46 terms, which is easily handled, but 5-LIST (2) has size approximately 2 24 , requiring a maximum over 2 64 terms, which presents a computational challenge.) We use the fact that all non-trivial rows and columns of the AES s-box DP table have the same distribution of values [10] , given in the non-increasing sequence kd 1 this choice of a 1 , . . . , a J , that is, if 1 J , 5 , then
Now form the sequence S ¼ ks 1 , s 2 , . . . , s d(Z) l, where
] contains some or all of the inner differences for certain two-round characteristics (depending on whether Z [ B d -LIST (2) or Z [ B d -LIST (1) , respectively), s i is a partially or fully formed EDCP value (fully formed if B d -LIST (1) and J ¼ 5). These 'certain characteristics' are those with input/output patterns g/ĝ that are the same as the patterns used in Definition 1 for the derivation of Z.
Sort the sequence S in non-increasing order to obtain S ¼ ks 1 , s 2 , . . ., s d(Z) l. It follows from a generalised version of Lemma 5 in [7] that
and therefore Q(S, J ) can be used as an easily computed 'lookahead' value for pruning purposes. (Note that the unsorted S is passed to Q.) Clearly equality holds in (2) when J ¼ 5, since
For any positive integer L, let 1 L be the sequence k1, . . . , 1l of length L. The heart of our algorithm is the recursive function F given in the following pseudocode, which uses a global variable E.
It is easy to see that if s(Z) . E prior to the call to F, then E ¼ s(Z) afterwards; otherwise, E is unchanged. It follows that when this phase is complete, E is equal to the lower bound of Theorem 1.
Phase II of algorithm: Retain the value of E from Phase I, and call F(Z, 0, 1 d(Z) ) for each Z [ 5-LIST (2) . The final value of E is the upper bound of Theorem 2. If this upper bound is equal to the lower bound from Phase I, then E is the exact two-round MEDP.
Results (MEDP)
Phase I of the above algorithm produced the lower bound 53/2 34 , a known result [3, 6] . What is new is that Phase II did not increase the value of E, and therefore the exact two-round AES MEDP is equal to 53/2 34 ' 1.656 Â 2 229 . Further, using the fact that the fourth power of an upper bound on the AES MEDP for T ¼ 2 is an upper bound for T ! 4 (see Section 2), we obtain a new upper bound on the AES MEDP for four or more rounds, namely (53/2 34 ) 4 ' 1.881 Â 2 2114 . There are 12 pairs of input/output differences (Dx, Dy) for the two-round structure in Fig. 1 whose EDP is equal to the MEDP. These are given in Table 1 (individual bytes are in hexadecimal). Notice the rotational symmetry, which is also observed in [14] .
Application to linear cryptanalysis
The duality between differential and linear cryptanalyses allows us to apply our algorithm, mutatis mutandis, to compute the exact two-round AES MELP. The significant changes are as follows: † Differential probability is replaced by LP, and EDP by ELP. For B: f0,1g
where † denotes the inner product. † Given input/output masks for round t, a t /a HULL(a, b) , consisting of all linear characteristics (over T core rounds) having input mask a and output mask b. The equation corresponding to (1) is given in [18] : 
where x ¼ L 0 y} † All non-trivial rows and columns of the AES s-box LP table have the same distribution of values, given in Table  2 (r i is a distinct value, and f i is the frequency with which it occurs) [7] . The sequence kd 1 , d 2 , . . . , d 256 l is modified accordingly.
Results (MELP)
For the linear cryptanalysis version of our algorithm, Phase I produced the known lower bound, 109, 953, 193/2 54 ' 1.638 Â 2 228 [3, 6] . And, as in the differential setting, Phase II did not increase this value, and therefore we conclude that this is the exact two-round AES MELP.
In addition, we use the relationship stated in Section 2 to obtain a new upper bound on the AES MELP for four or more rounds, namely (109, 953, 193/2 54 ) 4 ' 1.802 Â 2
2110
. There are four pairs of input/output masks (a, b) for the two-round structure in Fig. 1 whose ELP is equal to the MELP. These are given in Table 3 (individual bytes are in hexadecimal). We see the same rotational symmetry as in Table 1 . 
